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INTRODUCTION 
The conditions under which trademarks1 should be “traded”—that is, 
assigned and licensed in the marketplace—have traditionally been at the 
center of the debate on trademark functions and trademark protection.2  His-
torically, based upon the assumption that trademarks cannot be protected as 
commodities per se, but only as conveyers of commercial information and 
as symbols of business goodwill,3 trademark law has prohibited trading in 
trademarks “in gross.”4  Instead, the law has required that trademarks be 
assigned “with the goodwill” of the business to which they refer,5 and has 
allowed trademark licensing6 only as long as licensors control the quality of 
the products bearing the licensed marks.7 
Ever since their adoption, however, these criteria have proven contro-
versial and difficult to enforce because they hinge on two concepts that are 
ambiguous and difficult to frame in a legislative context: “trademark good-
will” and “quality control.”8  In addition, trading in trademarks per se has 
  
 1. For definitions of “trademark” and “service mark,” see 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2005).  
This Article will use the words “trademark” and “mark” interchangeably and as encompass-
ing all the symbols protected by the Trademark Act of 1946 [hereinafter Lanham Act]. 
 2. On the history and rationale for trademark protection, see 4 J. THOMAS 
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 24-25 (4th ed. 
2007); FRANK I. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING TO 
TRADEMARKS (1925); Sidney A. Diamond, The Historical Development of Trademarks, 65 
TRADEMARK REP. 265 (1975); Benjamin G. Paster, Trademarks—Their Early History, 59 
TRADEMARK REP. 551 (1969); Gerald Ruston, On the Origin of Trademarks, 45 TRADEMARK 
REP. 127 (1955). 
 3. On the economic functions of trademarks, see generally William M. Landes & 
Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1987) 
(highlighting that trademark protection has historically been based on the information pro-
vided by trademarks as to the origin and quality of the marked products, thus reducing con-
sumer search costs).  
 4. See, e.g., Marshak v. Green, 746 F.2d 927, 929 (2d Cir. 1984); Mister Donut of 
Am., Inc. v. Mr. Donut, Inc., 418 F.2d 838, 842 (9th Cir. 1969). 
 5. See Grover C. Grismore, The Assignment of Trade Marks and Trade Names, 30 
MICH. L. REV. 489 (1932); Walter J. Halliday, Assignments Under the Lanham Act, 38 
TRADEMARK REP. 970 (1948); Wallace R. Lane, The Transfer of Trademarks and Trade 
Names, 6 U. ILL. L. REV. 46 (1911).  This Article will use the terms “assignment in gross” 
and “assignment with or without goodwill” interchangeably. 
 6. This Article will use the terms “trademark licensing,” “licensing,” “trademark 
licenses,” “licenses,” and “licensing agreements” interchangeably. 
 7. See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 415 (1916), superseded 
by statute, Lanham Act, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (1946), as recognized in Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. 
Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189 (1995); Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 
267 F.2d 358, 367 (2d Cir. 1959); see also Alfred M. Marks, Trademark Licensing—
Towards a More Flexible Standard, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 641 (1988); Kevin Parks, “Naked” 
is Not a Four-Letter Word: Debunking the Myth of the “Quality Control Requirement” in 
Trademark Licensing, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 531 (1992). 
 8. See discussion infra Sections II.A & II.B. 
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always been common in the business world, and trademark owners have 
traditionally argued that trademarks often represent the most valuable assets 
of their businesses and, accordingly, should be traded freely.9 
Not surprisingly, the result of such uncertainty has been inconsistent 
case law and much ambiguity as to what currently represents a valid trade-
mark assignment and a valid trademark license.10  Still, in the past few dec-
ades, the discrepancy between the current rules on assignment and licensing 
and their enforcement in practice has escalated.  Notably, in several in-
stances, courts have drifted away from the goodwill and quality control re-
quirements and decided on the validity of the agreements case-by-case by 
looking primarily at the ultimate result—particularly, whether the quality of 
the marked products has changed and whether the public was confused as a 
result of such changes.  Hence, this trend has neither officially abandoned 
the current statutory requirements nor established a clear path to what repre-
sents a valid assignment or license.11  Accordingly, much confusion contin-
ues to surround the application of these rules, and competitors are left won-
dering how to structure valid agreements. 
This Article advocates for a change in the current standards.  Specifi-
cally, the Article proposes the adoption of new rules that would allow trad-
ing of trademarks “in gross”—that is, assignment “with or without good-
will” and licensing “with or without control.”  In support of these changes, 
this Article demonstrates that the current rules are negatively affecting mar-
ket competition and promoting unnecessary legal actions by unfair competi-
tors.  Building upon the recent judicial trend, this Article proposes that the 
courts should assess the validity of assignments and licenses by focusing 
directly on the result of the agreements at issue—i.e., whether the use of the 
assigned or licensed marks will confuse or deceive the public.  These 
changes would not hinder but would rather foster market competition.  Fi-
nally, they would not affect the existing rules that are already available to 
the judiciary to prevent and sanction unlawful assignments and licenses. 
I.  THE CURRENT STANDARDS FOR “TRADING” TRADEMARKS 
Part I provides an overview of the current rules on trademark assign-
ment and licensing and briefly elaborates on their history and rationale.  The 
  
 9. See, e.g., Nathan Isaacs, Traffic in Trade-Symbols, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1210 
(1931). 
 10. See generally Lisa H. Johnston, Drifting Toward Trademark Rights in Gross, 85 
TRADEMARK REP. 19 (1995) (illustrating such confusion and how trademark protection has 
drifted toward allowing trademark rights in gross in several areas of trademark law). 
 11. See discussion infra Sections I.A-B; see also 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 18:10 (4th ed. 2007) (highlighting 
inconsistent case law on trademark assignment); Parks, supra note 7, at 538 (criticizing in-
consistency in judicial decisions on trademark licensing). 
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rule against assignments “in gross”—or in favor of assignments “with good-
will”—was originally developed at common law, later codified into the fed-
eral trademark statute in 1905 (1905 Act), and finally confirmed in the 
Lanham Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act).12  The rule that licensors 
ought to control the quality of the products manufactured by their licensees 
was also developed by the judiciary in the 1920s and later introduced into 
the statute with the adoption of the Lanham Act.13  Previously, however, 
both at common law and under the rule of the 1905 Act, licensing was pro-
hibited as a violation of the primary function of a mark—namely, to indicate 
the origin of the marked products. 
A.  The Rule of Trademark Assignment “With Goodwill” 
Section 10(a)(1) of the Lanham Act sets forth the conditions for the 
assignment of trademarks, specifically that “[a] registered mark or a mark 
for which an application . . . has been filed shall be assignable with the 
goodwill of the business in which the mark is used, or with that part of the 
goodwill of the business connected with the use of and symbolized by the 
mark.”14  According to Section 14 of the Act, trademark assignments with-
out associated goodwill are invalid and can lead to the cancellation of the 
assigned mark if they are used to misrepresent the source of the marked 
products.15  Assignments “in gross” can also lead to the abandonment of the 
assigned mark as indicated in Section 45,16 “[w]hen any course of conduct 
of the owner, including acts of omission as well as commission, causes the 
mark . . . to lose its significance as a mark.”17 
Section 10(a)(2) limits the assignment of goodwill to those marks that 
are effectively assigned and not to any additional mark that may also be 
  
 12. See Irene Calboli, Trademark Assignment “With Goodwill”: A Concept Whose 
Time Has Gone, 57 FLA. L. REV. 771, 784-88 (2005) [hereinafter Calboli, Trademark As-
signment] (reconstructing the legislative and judicial history of the rule of assignment “with 
goodwill”). 
 13. See Irene Calboli, The Sunset of “Quality Control” in Modern Trademark Li-
censing, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 341 (2007) [hereinafter Calboli, Trademark Licensing] (provid-
ing an analytical overview of the history and rationale of the current rule of trademark licens-
ing). 
 14. 15 U.S.C. § 1060(a)(1) (2005) (emphasis added). 
 15. Id. § 1064(3).  “A petition to cancel . . . a mark . . . may . . . be filed . . . [a]t any 
time . . . if the registered mark is being used by, or with the permission of, the registrant so as 
to misrepresent the source of the goods or services on or in connection with which the mark 
is used.”  Id. 
 16. See, e.g., PepsiCo, Inc. v. Grapette Co., 416 F.2d 285, 290 (8th Cir. 1969); Pi-
lates, Inc. v. Current Concepts, Inc., 120 F. Supp. 2d 286, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Hiland Po-
tato Chip Co. v. Culbro Corp., 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 352, 354 (S.D. Iowa 1981). 
 17. 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
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used by the assignor in the same business.18  Section 501.06 of the Trade-
mark Manual of Examination Procedure (TMEP) of the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office (USPTO)19 further limits the extent of Section 10, 
providing that trademark owners are free to assign their marks only with 
respect to some of the products for which the mark is registered, while still 
retaining the right to use the mark to identify other products.20  The provi-
sion also allows joint ownership of a mark and states that joint owners may 
assign their interest in a mark independently.21  Similarly, the sole owner of 
a mark can assign only “a portion (e.g., 50%) of his or her interest in the 
mark to another party,”22 while retaining control of the remaining portion of 
the mark. 
Finally, to prevent trafficking in trademark applications, Section 10 of 
the Lanham Act also forbids the assignment of intent-to-use (ITU) trade-
mark applications and states that “no application to register a mark under 
Section 1051(b) . . . shall be assignable prior to the filing of an amendment 
under Section 1051(c).”23 
As mentioned above, the rationale for the rule against assignments in 
gross rests on the general principle of trademark protection that trademarks 
cannot be protected per se and are only protectable because of the informa-
tion they convey to consumers.24  On the contrary, protecting common 
words as trademarks per se would necessarily hinder competition and de-
prive society of access to common language.25  To prevent unfair competi-
tion, however, courts have also articulated the principle that if trademarks 
cannot be protected per se, their goodwill may enjoy direct protection.26  As 
a corollary to this principle, courts have developed the rule that if marks 
  
 18. Id. § 1060(a)(2).  Section 1060(a)(2) provides that in an assignment, “it shall not 
be necessary to include the good will of the business connected with the use of and symbol-
ized by any other mark used in the business or by the name or style under which the business 
is conducted.”  Id. 
 19. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE § 501.06 (5th ed. 2007). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id.  “A trademark may be owned by two or more persons . . . and a co-owner 
may assign his or her interest in a mark.”  Id. 
 22. Id.  
 23. 15 U.S.C. § 1060(a)(1). 
 24. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, §§ 23-24. 
 25. See, e.g., United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918), 
superseded by statute, Lanham Act, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (1946). 
 26. See Kemp v. Bumble Bee Seafoods, Inc., 398 F.3d 1049, 1056-57 (8th Cir. 
2005); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 
2004). 
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exist and can be protected as symbols of goodwill, they must be assigned 
with that goodwill.27 
Though courts have established that trademarks ought to be trans-
ferred with their associated goodwill, they have never provided a satisfac-
tory definition of goodwill,28 and the past decades have witnessed the judi-
ciary’s use of ambiguous and open-ended definitions that have often led to 
inconsistent case law in this area.29  Likewise, no clarification of what repre-
sents goodwill was provided by the trademark statute after the introduction 
of this rule into the Act of 1905 or the Lanham Act.30  As criticized in this 
Article, the lack of a clear definition of goodwill and the ambiguity sur-
rounding its current interpretation constitute the primary failures of the cur-
rent rule on trademark assignment. 
B.  The Rule of Trademark Licensing “With Quality Control” 
Sections 5 and 45 of the Lanham Act state the conditions for the valid-
ity of trademark licensing.  As indicated earlier, licensing was not allowed 
at common law or under the Trademark Act of 1905.  Presumably because 
of the economic changes that took place in the early twentieth century, 
however, the Lanham Act follows the position that had already been 
adopted by some courts and acknowledges that a mark can be validly used 
by “related companies.”  Still, the statute construes the requirements for the 
validity of this practice based upon the primary function of a mark—
namely, to identify the origin of the marked products. 
In particular, Section 5 of the Lanham Act states that while a “regis-
tered mark or a mark sought to be registered . . . may be used legitimately 
by related companies,” this use “shall inure to the benefit of the registrant or 
applicant for registration” and “shall not affect the validity of such mark or 
of its registration, provided such mark is not used in such manner as to de-
ceive the public.”31  The same principle applies to the licensing of ITU 
  
 27. See Grismore, supra note 5, at 491.  “[I]t is obviously a truism to say that one 
cannot assign a trade mark in gross . . . since one does not own a mark in gross . . . [and] all 
one can do is to transfer to another one’s acquired good will or expectation of custom . . . .”  
Id. 
 28. See JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, THE LAW OF UNFAIR TRADE: INCLUDING TRADE-
MARKS, TRADE SECRETS, AND GOOD-WILL § 61, at 132 (1900).  “[T]here is difficulty in decid-
ing accurately what is included under [Goodwill].”  Id. 
 29. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 18:10.  “While some courts will apply the     
. . . rule with myopic vigor, other courts will interpret ‘good will’ so as to focus on the nature 
of the assignee’s use, not the formalism of what assets passed to the assignee.”  Id. at 18-23. 
 30. See Calboli, Trademark Assignment, supra note 12, at 802.  
 31. Lanham Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 1055 (2005) (emphasis added); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 33 cmt. b (1995).  “If the trademark owner 
exercises reasonable control over the nature and quality of the licensee’s goods or services, 
the benefits of the licensee’s use accrue to the trademark owner.”  Id. 
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trademark applications.32  According to Section 5, “[i]f first use of a mark 
 . . . is controlled by the registrant or applicant for registration of the mark 
with respect to the nature and quality of the goods or services, such first use 
shall inure to the benefit of the registrant or applicant, as the case may be.”33  
As elaborated in Part II infra, this language seems to lay the legal founda-
tion for promotional licensing or trademark merchandising.34 
Section 45 of the Lanham Act provides the definitions of “such use” 
and “related companies” that are used in Section 5.  Specifically, the provi-
sion defines a “related company” as “any person whose use of a mark is 
controlled by the owner of the mark with respect to the nature and quality of 
the goods or services on or in connection with which the mark is used.”35 
Similar to assignments “in gross,” licensing without quality control 
can entail the forfeiture of trademark rights and is subject to the provision of 
Section 14 if consumers are misled as a result of the agreement.36  Invalid 
licenses can also lead to the abandonment of the licensed mark per Section 
45,37 regardless of whether the owner intended to abandon the mark.38  Fi-
nally, lack of quality control and resulting differences in product quality can 
result in liability for false advertising under the Federal Trade Commission 
Act when the marks are used as instruments to defraud the public by induc-
ing consumers to believe that product quality is different from reality.39 
  
 32. This part of the provision was introduced into the original text as a result of the 
Trademark Revision Act of 1988.  See Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 
100-667, 102 Stat. 3935 (codified as amended throughout 15 U.S.C. § 1060). 
 33. 15 U.S.C. § 1055. 
 34. This type of licensing has become increasingly important in the past decades and 
is used, for example, for MCDONALD’S T-shirts, RED SOX hats, or WESTLAW candies, 
which are usually not directly related to the goods and services manufactured or distributed 
by the trademark owners.  See Marks, supra note 7, at 641.  But see Stacey L. Dogan & Mark 
A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 
461 (2005). 
 35. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.  Originally, a “related company” was defined as “any person 
who legitimately controls or is controlled by the registrant or applicant for registration in 
respect to the nature and quality of the goods or services in connection with which the mark 
is used.”  Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1946).  This definition was amended by delet-
ing the word “legitimately” in 1988 with the adoption of the Trademark Law Revision Act.  
See Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, § 134. 
 36. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3).  See Barcamerica Int’l USA Trust v. Tyfield Imps., Inc., 
289 F.3d 589 (9th Cir. 2002); Stanfield v. Osborne Indus., Inc., 52 F.3d 867 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 37. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.  See, e.g., Oberlin v. Marlin Am. Corp., 596 F.2d 1322 (7th 
Cir. 1979); Haymaker Sports, Inc. v. Turian, 581 F.2d 257 (C.C.P.A. 1978); Westco Group, 
Inc. v. K.B. & Assocs., Inc., 128 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (N.D. Ohio 2001). 
 38. See Barcamerica Int’l, 289 F.3d at 589. 
 39. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 18:48, at 18-103 (citing Waltham Watch Co. 
v. FTC, 318 F.2d 28 (7th Cir. 1963) (FTC Act violation); Scotch Whiskey Ass’n v. Barton 
Distilling Co., 338 F. Supp. 595 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (false advertising in violation of Lanham 
Act § 43(a)), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 489 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1973)). 
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As indicated earlier, the “quality control” requirement was first cre-
ated by the courts prior to the enactment of the Lanham Act.40  To justify the 
validity of licensing, courts stretched the interpretation of the origin func-
tion of a mark and argued that such function was respected even if the 
original trademark owners did not produce the marked products, as long as 
they controlled the actual manufacturers.41  While establishing such limits 
for the validity of licensing, however, the judiciary never defined “quality 
control” nor elaborated on how much control was necessary or sufficient for 
licensing agreements to be considered valid in practice.  Similarly, neither 
Sections 5 nor 45 provided any clarification in this sense once the require-
ment was introduced into the statute.  As elaborated below, this lack of 
statutory or judicial guidance represents the major problem in the applica-
tion of the quality control requirement. 
II.  THE INCREASING UNSUSTAINABILITY OF THE CURRENT STANDARDS 
Part II highlights the unsustainability of the current rules for the valid-
ity of trademark assignments and licensing in the modern economy.  Even if 
the language of these rules has remained untouched until today, their inter-
pretation has been plagued by judicial inconsistency since their introduction 
into the law.  For the most part, this inconsistency can be attributed to the 
difficulty in interpreting the concepts of “trademark goodwill” and “quality 
control.”  As a result, courts have drifted away from the task of interpreting 
these concepts and have increasingly adopted a pragmatic position—
declaring the assignments or licenses at issue valid as long as the public is 
not deceived as a result of the agreements.  Modern trademark practices 
such as assignments, licenses-back, and promotional licensing have also 
contributed to widening this disconnect between trademark theory and real-
ity in the past decades. 
A.  Problems and Inconsistencies of Assignment “With Goodwill” 
As stressed earlier, since its adoption, the major flaw of the rule of as-
signment “with goodwill” has been the lack of a clear definition of “good-
will.”42  As a result, courts often struggled to assess whether the assignments 
at issue were valid, and ultimately adopted a case-by-case approach to the 
issue.43  To resolve this impasse, shortly after the creation of the rule of as-
  
 40. See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf., 240 U.S. 403 (1916), superseded by 
statute, Lanham Act, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (1946), as recognized in Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dol-
lar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189 (1995); Kidd v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 617 (1879). 
 41. See, e.g., 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 18:40. 
 42. See discussion supra Sections I.A-B. 
 43. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 18:10. 
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signment “with goodwill,” courts started to consider the “reality of the 
transaction[s],” which allowed them to assume that a mark’s goodwill had 
been transferred, rather than defining and tracking the transfer of the good-
will per se.44  For this purpose, common law courts relied upon the transfer 
of the whole business, or part of it, to confirm that goodwill had been trans-
ferred as well.  This practice was in place under the 1905 Act and continued 
even after enactment of the Lanham Act.45 
Toward the 1950s, however, due to changes in the economy that fol-
lowed the end of the war, courts started to accept that trademark transfers 
did not necessarily have to entail the transfer of business assets.46  Accord-
ingly, courts started to rely on the “substantial similarity” of the marked 
products in order to once again assume transfer of goodwill.47  With the 
passing of the decades, however, this “substantial similarity” became “suffi-
cient similarity,”48 and in some instances courts held that as long as the 
products were not totally different from each other, they still satisfied the 
requirement of Section 10.49  More recently, courts’ approaches have be-
come even more radical, and the judiciary has often upheld assignments 
clearly “in gross” as long as the public was not deceived as a result of the 
agreements.50  Still, the courts have never explicitly acknowledged that as-
signments “without” goodwill are valid.  Instead they have adopted an in-
  
 44. See Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Narula, No. 99C6997, 2001 WL 804025, at 
*7 (N.D. Ill. July 12, 2001). 
 45. See MacMahan Pharmacal Co. v. Denver Chem. Mfg. Co., 113 F. 468, 474-75 
(8th Cir. 1901); see also Calboli, Trademark Assignment, supra note 12, at 789. 
 46. Instead, courts started to rely on the “continuity” of the marked products.  See 
Vittoria N. Am., L.L.C. v. Euro-Asia Imps. Inc., 278 F.3d 1076, 1083 (10th Cir. 2001) 
(“Transfer of assets is not a sine qua non for transferring the goodwill associated with a 
trademark.”); Visa, U.S.A., Inc. v. Birmingham Trust Nat’l Bank, 696 F.2d 1371, 1375 (Fed. 
Cir. 1982) (“A valid transfer of a mark . . . does not require the transfer of any physical or 
tangible assets.  All that is necessary is the transfer of the goodwill to which the mark per-
tains.”); J. C. Hall Co. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 340 F.2d 960, 963 (C.C.P.A. 1965) (“It is a 
matter of no significant import with reference to . . . the validity of the assignment . . . that no 
tangible assets were transferred . . . .”). 
 47. See generally Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 
411-14 (1999) (criticizing the increasing use by the judiciary of the test of “substantial simi-
larity”). 
 48. See Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp. v. Mattress Madness, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 
1339, 1350 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). 
 49. See Money Store v. Harriscorp Fin., Inc., 689 F.2d 666, 678 (7th Cir. 1982) 
(upholding an assignment where the assignee did not offer “a service different from that 
offered by the assignor”). 
 50. See Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Narula, No. 99C6997, 2001 WL 804025, at 
*7 (N.D. Ill. July 12, 2001).  “The focus should be on protecting customers’ legitimate ex-
pectation of continuity under the mark, not on searching for a ‘stereo-typed set of formali-
ties.’”  Id. (quoting 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 18:24).  “[U]nder the modern view, the 
assignment should be upheld if the transaction is such that the buyer is enabled to go on in 
real continuity with the past . . . .”  3 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 18:24, at 18-54. 
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creasingly broad interpretation of “goodwill”—i.e., intangible value at-
tached to a mark—and held that the transfer of a mark per se could imply 
the transfer of the attached goodwill as long as the assignee’s use of the 
assigned mark did not harm or deceive the purchasing public.51 
In addition to this judicial trend clearly in favor of free assignments, 
the current practice of trademark law has also created legal maneuvers to 
bypass Section 10.  In particular, the past years have seen an increasing use 
of trademark assignments and licenses-back where trademark owners assign 
their marks to assignees who in turn license the marks back to the original 
owners.52  Most often this practice is used to settle claims of trademark in-
fringement or to secure priority in the ownership of a specific mark.53  This 
practice is also increasingly used by trademark owners as collateral for 
loans.54  The purpose of this type of agreement, however, is not to continue 
to produce products that are “substantially similar” to those produced by the 
assignee, since the assignee was not producing the original products in the 
first place.  Instead, the real purpose of these contracts is to acquire control 
of the assigned mark per se.  In line with their recent approach in favor of 
assignments “in gross,” courts have generally supported the validity of this 
practice, which they have characterized as a “well-settled commercial prac-
tice”55 that has the benefit of “bringing ‘commercial reality into congruence 
with customer perception.’”56 
Finally, recent years have also seen trademark owners increasingly us-
ing their marks as collateral for loans, once again with the blessing of the 
majority of the judiciary.57  As indicated above, secured transactions involv-
ing trademarks are usually structured as conditional assignments and li-
censes-back, since lenders do not have any interest in using the marks, 
which only secure the lenders against the borrowers’ default.58  Still, to 
serve as future notice to third parties, these contracts need to be registered 
with the USPTO, and since the USPTO does not distinguish between final 
and conditional assignments, these contracts are also subject to the goodwill 
  
 51. See Calboli, Trademark Assignment, supra note 12, at 814-16. 
 52. See Glow Indus., Inc. v. Lopez, 273 F. Supp. 2d 1095 (C.D. Cal. 2003). 
 53. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 18:9. 
 54. See Calboli, Trademark Assignment, supra note 12, at 795. 
 55. Visa, U.S.A., Inc. v. Birmingham Trust Nat’l Bank, 696 F.2d 1371, 1377 (Fed. 
Cir. 1982). 
 56. E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1290 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(quoting 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 18:1(I) (2d ed. 
1984)). 
 57. See Allison Sell McDade, Note, Trading in Trademarks—Why the Anti-
Assignment in Gross Doctrine Should Be Abolished When Trademarks Are Used as Collat-
eral, 77 TEX. L. REV. 465 (1998). 
 58. See Calboli, Trademark Assignment, supra note 12, at 797-98. 
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requirement.59  In practice, however, courts have confirmed the validity of 
these agreements when no tangible assets are transferred as part of the se-
cured transaction, as long as the public was not harmed as a result, once 
again confirming courts’ de facto abandonment of a strict interpretation of 
the rule of Section 10.60 
B.  Problems and Inconsistencies of Licensing “With Quality Control” 
As mentioned above, judicial inconsistency has also characterized the 
application of the rule of licensing “with quality control,” and as of today, 
licensors and licensees continue to be left with much uncertainty as to what 
constitutes valid licensing.61  In this context, the main reason for such uncer-
tainty can traditionally be attributed to the lack of a clear definition of qual-
ity control, both in the statute and by the judiciary.62  As a result, courts 
have generally adopted a case-by-case approach to the issue, which has of-
ten led to diverging conclusions.63  Similar to their approach to trademark 
assignment, however, courts have also increasingly demonstrated a favor-
able attitude toward licensing in recent decades and have invalidated 
agreements only sporadically.64 
In particular, during the pre- and immediately post-Lanham Act years, 
the judiciary consistently held that trademark owners had an affirmative 
duty to police their licenses, including the actual quality of their products, or 
their licenses would be held invalid.65  Starting in the 1960s, however, 
courts started to drift away from such strict enforcement of the requirement 
and repeatedly held that “adequate” control was sufficient to comply with 
  
 59. 37 C.F.R. § 3.56 (2006).  “Assignments which are made conditional on the 
performance of certain acts or events, such as the payment of money or other condition sub-
sequent, if recorded in the Office, are regarded as absolute assignments for Office purposes   
. . . .”  Id. 
 60. See In re Roman Cleanser Co., 802 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1986); see also 3 
MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 18:7. 
 61. See Ann E. Doll, Trademark Licensing: Quality Control, 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL 
ISSUES 203 (2001).  “How much control must the licensor exercise to assure consumers and to 
protect against mark abandonment?  The courts do not provide specific answers . . . .”  Id. at 
205. 
 62. See discussion supra Section I.B. 
 63. See Calboli, Trademark Licensing, supra note 13, at 364. 
 64. See Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 
108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1710 (1999) (criticizing this judicial trend). 
 65. See, e.g., Huber Baking Co. v. Stroehmann Bros., 252 F.2d 945, 952-53 (2d Cir. 
1958); E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Celanese Corp. of Am., 167 F.2d 484, 489 
(C.C.P.A. 1948); Arthur Murray, Inc. v. Horst, 110 F. Supp. 678, 679 (D. Mass. 1953); 
Broeg v. Duchaine, 67 N.E.2d 466 (Mass. 1946). 
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quality control.66  In the following years, “adequate” control became “suffi-
cient”67 or even “minimal”68 control, and recent decades have invariably 
confirmed this trend, thus showing the reluctance of the judiciary to declare 
trademark licenses invalid.69  Still, courts never held that quality control had 
become an unnecessary burden for trademark owners.  Instead, they increas-
ingly turned their attention to the actual quality of the licensed products, 
assuming that if the products were the same or substantially similar to each 
other, quality control could be implied and, accordingly, the licenses under 
scrutiny were valid.70  Accordingly, although not officially, this approach 
has greatly contributed to distancing the judiciary from the application of 
quality control and has thus rendered the requirement increasingly empty 
and sterile. 
In addition to this judicial trend, current trademark practices have con-
tributed to the growing distance between the quality control requirement 
and its de facto application.  In particular, during the past twenty years, a 
new form of licensing has become increasingly important in the market-
place: promotional licensing.71  This practice—which is also called trade-
mark merchandising—usually involves the use of a licensed mark on unre-
lated products, and its direct goal is not to increase production as in tradi-
tional licensing, but instead to build and enhance brand image and consumer 
affiliation by affixing the licensed mark to various types of promotional 
products (for example, T-shirts, mugs, pens, etc.).72  As critics of the quality 
  
 66. See, e.g., Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 367 (2d 
Cir. 1959); Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co. v. Shelley Knitting Mills, Inc., 212 F. Supp. 715, 
740 (E.D. Pa. 1962). 
 67. See Karin Segall, Trademark Licensing: The Quality Control Requirement; 
International Trademark License Provisions; Click Licenses, 775 PLI/PAT 353, 358 (2004) 
(surveying judicial decisions that only required “sufficient control”). 
 68. Id. at 386.  For other examples in which mere minimal control was deemed 
sufficient, see Penta Hotels Ltd. v. Penta Tours, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1081 (D. Conn. 1988); 
Bureau National Interprofessional Du Cognac v. International Better Drinks Corp., 6 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1610 (T.T.A.B. 1988); Nestle Co. v. Nash-Finch Co., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1085 (T.T.A.B. 1987); Embedded Moments, Inc. v. International Silver Co., 648 F. 
Supp. 187 (E.D.N.Y. 1986). 
 69. See, e.g., Karen Marie Kitterman, Quality Control in Trademark Licensing, 821 
PLI/PAT 509, 515 (2005). 
 70. See, e.g., Taco Cabana Int’l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 
1991), aff’d, 505 U.S. 763 (1992); Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 
1001 (9th Cir. 1985); Land O’Lakes Creameries, Inc. v. Oconomowoc Canning Co., 330 
F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1964). 
 71. The recognition of this practice dates back to the decision in Boston Professional 
Hockey Ass’n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Manufacturing, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 459 (N.D. Tex. 
1973), rev’d in part, 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975).  But see Dogan & Lemley, supra note 
34, at 471-73 (criticizing the decision and the foundation of trademark merchandising per 
se). 
 72. See W. J. Keating, Promotional Trademark Licensing: A Concept Whose Time 
Has Come, 89 DICK. L. REV. 363 (1985). 
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control requirement have repeatedly pointed out, this practice has tradition-
ally proven incompatible with a meaningful enforcement of quality control, 
since trademark owners most often lack expertise in the promotional goods 
industry.73  Clearly aware of this fact, the judiciary has rarely questioned the 
validity of licenses based on lack of quality control and instead has com-
monly relied on the consistent quality of the marked products—that is, on 
the “reality of the transaction” test—to assume that such control has been 
exercised.74 
Similarly, the rise of assignments and licenses-back has added to the 
growing acceptance of de facto licensing “in gross.”  As indicated earlier, 
the rationale behind this practice profoundly deviates from a traditional 
trademark transfer or license.75  Instead, assignees/licensors enter this type 
of agreement to acquire control over a mark—often to settle infringement 
claims and to prevent future claims of abandonment or “dirty hands”—and 
rarely do they have the interest or the expertise to control the quality of the 
products manufactured.  At the same time, the assignors/licensees accept 
these contracts merely to avoid being held liable for infringement while 
continuing their economic activity under the same mark.76  Trademark con-
trol in case of a borrower’s default is also the primary reason why lenders 
use these agreements when marks are used as collateral for loans77—quality 
control again being outside the practical scope of these transactions since 
lenders rarely have the expertise, or the interest, to supervise the quality of 
the products produced under the now-licensed mark.78 
Finally, as additional evidence of its pragmatic approach to the issue, 
the judiciary has further undermined the possibility of strictly enforcing 
quality control by developing the so-called doctrine of licensee estoppel.79  
Under this doctrine, licensees are barred from bringing claims of lack of 
quality control against licensors for the whole duration of the licensing 
  
 73. See generally Lisa H. Johnston, Drifting Toward Trademark Rights in Gross, 85 
TRADEMARK REP. 19, 35 (1995) (noting that “[t]he argument for abolishing the quality con-
trol requirement focuses on the fact that in promotional merchandising the consumer does 
not expect a preordained quality level”). 
 74. See Calboli, Trademark Licensing, supra note 13, at 371. 
 75. See discussion supra Section II.A. 
 76. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 18:9 n.4. 
 77. See, e.g., Visa, U.S.A., Inc. v. Birmingham Trust Nat’l Bank, 696 F.2d 1371 
(Fed. Cir. 1982). 
 78. To avoid the duty of monitoring the quality of the products, secured transactions 
are also generally structured as conditional assignments, which do not vest legal title under 
the UCC and become operative only if lenders enforce or foreclose the security upon bor-
rowers’ default.  See U.C.C. § 9-108 (2000). 
 79. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 18:63; see also James M. Treece, Licensee 
Estoppel in Patent and Trademark Cases, 53 IOWA L. REV. 525 (1967). 
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agreement.80  As stated by the courts, this doctrine is based on equitable 
principles and aims primarily at safeguarding predictable contractual rela-
tions.81  In reality, however, this doctrine represents a further step toward 
courts’ acceptance of licensing without control. 
III.  WHAT IF, AFTER ALL, TRADEMARKS WERE “TRADED IN GROSS”? 
Part III advocates for a change allowing free trademark assignment 
and licensing.  As illustrated above, the current rules have reached a state of 
“sterile formalism”82 and are out of touch with the needs of modern manu-
facturing and distribution.83  Accordingly, this Article proposes a change in 
favor of assignment “with or without goodwill”84 and licensing “with or 
without control,”85 where agreements would be held valid as long as they 
did not deceive or harm consumers.  Despite common criticisms, these 
changes would benefit competition in the marketplace and prevent frivolous 
legal actions.  Likewise, they would not allow misleading trading in trade-
marks because the courts would have alternative, and better, tools to prevent 
deceptive assignments and licensing. 
A.  The Case for “Trading” Trademarks “In Gross” 
For the reasons outlined above, the best way to resolve the conflict be-
tween the current rules on trademark assignment and licensing and their 
application in practice seems to be to allow free trading in trademarks.  
With particular respect to trademark assignment, as I have previously ar-
gued, this Article advocates for a change in the wording of Section 10, ei-
ther eliminating “with goodwill” from the provision or adding new language 
that would allow assignment “with or without goodwill.”86  With respect to 
licensing, this Article also advocates a change in the statutory language of 
Section 45 by eliminating any text directing trademark owners to exercise 
“control” over their licenses.87  Instead, as I have previously suggested, a  
  
 80. See Prof’l Golfers Ass’n of Am. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 514 F.2d 665 (5th 
Cir. 1975) (dismissing claim of abandonment based on uncontrolled licensing because estop-
pel barred the defense).  But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 33 cmt. d 
(1995) (“The case for estoppel is weaker when the licensee asserts a lack of control by the 
licensor over other users.”). 
 81. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 18:63. 
 82. Id. § 18:10. 
 83. Parks, supra note 7, at 531. 
 84. Calboli, Trademark Assignment, supra note 12, at 833. 
 85. Calboli, Trademark Licensing, supra note 13, at 389. 
 86. See Calboli, Trademark Assignment, supra note 12, at 833. 
 87. Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).  See discussion supra Section I.B. 
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“related company” should be defined as “any person whose use of a mark is au-
thorized by the owner of the mark provided that such mark is not used to deceive 
the public with respect to the nature and quality of the goods or services on or in 
connection with which the mark is used.” 88 
As elaborated earlier, the suggested amendments build upon recent ju-
dicial trends in assignment and licensing, respectively.89  They also resolve 
the major problem of the current rules: interpreting the indefinable concepts 
of trademark goodwill and quality control.  This problem will be avoided 
because the proposed amendments shift attention directly onto the impact of 
the transaction on the market.90  Courts have already begun to embrace this 
thinking and have repeatedly acknowledged that the validity of an assign-
ment or license should be assessed by looking at the overall extent of the 
transaction.91  Thus, these changes will bring the language of the rules in 
line with reality.92  With specific respect to licensing, amending the wording 
of Section 45 will also restore consistency to the statutory definition of “re-
lated company” and the language of Section 5, which does not require 
trademark owners to “control”93 their licenses, but rather focuses on the 
effects of the agreements at issue in the market, requiring only that the mark 
not be “used in such manner as to deceive the public.”94 
Equally important, a change in favor of the suggested standards will 
also reduce frivolous claims by trademark infringers during judicial pro-
ceedings.  As indicated above, the current rules base their rationale on con-
sumer protection, yet it is litigants, and not consumers, that generally utilize 
these rules in order to raise—often valid—“unclean hands” defenses against 
allegations of trademark infringement.95  As explained below, defendants 
would still be able to claim the invalidity of the agreements at issue under 
the new standards.  This invalidity, however, would not depend on the in-
  
 88. See Calboli, Trademark Licensing, supra note 13, at 396. 
 89. See discussion supra Sections II.A-B. 
 90. See Calboli, Trademark Assignment, supra note 12, at 833 (stressing this point 
against the rule of assignment “with goodwill”); Calboli, Trademark Licensing, supra note 
13, at 397 (making a similar observation in the context of licensing). 
 91. See, e.g., Money Store v. Harriscorp Fin., Inc., 689 F.2d 666, 676 (7th Cir. 1982) 
(determining that the words of the agreement are not enough to show transfer of goodwill, 
and instead looking to the entire transaction and the actions of the parties to make this deter-
mination); Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Narula, No. 99C6997, 2001 WL 804025, at *7 
(N.D. Ill. July 12, 2001) (basing its decision on the “reality of the transaction”); see also 
discussion supra Sections II.A-B. 
 92. See discussion supra Sections II.A-B. 
 93. Lanham Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 1055 (2000). 
 94. Id.; see also Keating, supra note 72, at 378. 
 95. See, e.g., Bourdeau Bros. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 444 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 
2006); Worthington v. Anderson, 386 F.3d 1314 (10th Cir. 2004); Citizens Fin. Group v. 
Citizens Nat’l Bank of Evans City, 383 F.3d 110 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Parks, supra note 7, 
at 531. 
360 Michigan State Law Review [Vol. 2008:345 
 
terpretation of ambiguous factors.  Rather, it would depend on the actual 
result of the use of the mark by assignees or licensees.96 
Amending the current rules would also resolve the current discrepancy 
between the language of the statute and the “well-settled” practice of as-
signment and license-back.97  Likewise, the suggested amendments would 
assist trademark owners who wish to use their marks as collateral for 
loans.98  In the licensing area, the suggested amendment would also better 
support the legitimacy of promotional licensing, which has become an in-
creasingly relevant business practice, the importance of which is sure to 
grow in the future.99  In addition, the proposed changes would eliminate the 
difference in treatment between original trademark owners and trademark 
owners who are assignees and licensors.  While assignees and licensors are 
subject to the transfer of goodwill and quality control requirements, respec-
tively, and have to provide the public with products of substantially similar 
quality, original trademark owners do not share the same duty and can 
change the quality of the products they sell under a mark as long as the pub-
lic is not confused or deceived.100  Under the new rules, assignees and licen-
sors would be as free as original trademark owners to change the quality of 
their products.  In addition, the suggested amendments would bring U.S. 
trademark law closer to the approach followed by the majority of other ju-
risdictions, thus eliminating many inconsistencies in the treatment of inter-
national assignment and licensing, to the advantage of international trade.101 
Lastly, in addition to restoring consistency to the rules and their appli-
cation, allowing free trading in trademarks could also increase competition 
in the marketplace to the advantage of consumers.  Able to assign or license 
  
 96. See Michelle S. Friedman, Note, Naked Trademark Licenses in Business Format 
Franchising: The Quality Control Requirement and the Role of Local Culture, 10 J. TECH. L. 
& POL’Y 353, 364 (2005) (citing Note, Quality Control and the Antitrust Laws in Trademark 
Licensing, 72 YALE L.J. 1171, 1174 (1963)); see also Baglin v. Cusenier Co., 221 U.S. 580 
(1911); Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 311, 324 (1871); Bulte v. Igleheart Bros., 137 
F. 492, 498 (7th Cir. 1905). 
 97. See Visa, U.S.A., Inc. v. Birmingham Trust Nat’l Bank, 696 F.2d 1371, 1377 
(Fed. Cir. 1982). 
 98. See McDade, supra note 57, at 491. 
 99. See Marks, supra note 7, at 647-48. 
 100. Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act expressly prohibits the registration of trade-
marks that are “deceptive.”  Lanham Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2000).  Deceptive 
trademarks are subject to cancellation according to Section 14(3).  Lanham Act § 14(3), 15 
U.S.C. § 1064(3).  See discussion supra Sections I.A-B; see also Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s 
Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 367 (2d Cir. 1959); Nat’l Lead Co. v. Wolfe, 223 F.2d 195, 
199 (9th Cir. 1955); Geo. Wash. Mint, Inc. v. Wash. Mint, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 255, 263 
(S.D.N.Y. 1972). 
 101. See Calboli, Trademark Assignment, supra note 12, at 816-28; 2 STEPHEN P. 
LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 
PROTECTION 1303-17 (1975); see also MARY M. SQUYRES, 1-2 TRADEMARK PRACTICE 
THROUGHOUT THE WORLD §§ 6-17 (2006). 
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their marks freely and without the concern of risking frivolous legal actions, 
trademark owners could save costs and, in turn, offer better and cheaper 
products to consumers.  In the case of assignment, assignors could also con-
tinue to produce similar products under a different mark without the risk of 
having the assignment declared void because goodwill was not transferred.  
This, in turn, would increase the number of comparable products available 
in the market for consumers.  As long as they inform the public, trademark 
owners would also be allowed to change the quality of marked products to 
better respond to market demands and consumer needs.102 
The economic argument in favor of free trademark trading is particu-
larly strong when one considers that the cancellation of a mark following a 
finding of naked assignment or licensing causes trademark owners to dis-
continue the production and distribution of the products bearing that 
mark.103  Amending the current rules to allow trading without goodwill and 
quality control would limit these cancellations—and the resulting reduction 
in products available to consumers—to agreements that actually deceive the 
public.  The same applies when trademark owners have to incur extra costs 
to rename their products and market them under the new name, considering 
that trademark cancellation allows other interested parties to use the mark.104  
Not surprisingly, these extra costs, which impact the ability of trademark 
owners to compete, will ultimately be carried, at least in part, by consum-
ers.105  To amend the current requirements as suggested will prevent these 
developments by limiting trademark cancellation to agreements that are 
truly misleading and unfair for the market.  
B.  Trading “In Gross” and Consumer Protection 
As demonstrated above, to allow trademark owners to trade their 
trademarks “in gross” could both restore consistency to the language of the 
trademark statute and its application by the judiciary, and benefit the market 
by increasing competition and preventing frivolous law suits.  Still, a 
  
 102. See Marks, supra note 7, at 651 (“‘Trademark theory should provide for con-
sumer protection, but it should also be flexible enough to permit satisfactory adaptation to 
new situations.’”) (quoting William M. Borchard & Richard M. Osman, Trademark Subli-
censing and Quality Control, 70 TRADEMARK REP. 99, 114 (1980)); see also Elmer William 
Hanak, III, The Quality Assurance Function of Trademarks, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 363, 367 
(1974). 
 103. See Calboli, Trademark Licensing, supra note 13, at 399-400. 
 104. See, e.g., R. Darryl Burke, Intellectual Property, 29 TEX. TECH L. REV. 711, 723 
(1998) (citing Exxon Corp. v. Oxxford Clothes, Inc., 109 F.3d 1070, 1077 (5th Cir. 1997), in 
which a finding of naked license ultimately caused Exxon to forfeit its right to use the trade-
marked symbol of interlocking x’s). 
 105. See Marks, supra note 7, at 648-49 (considering the costs incurred by companies 
that are less sophisticated in policing and controlling a popular trademark in licensing con-
texts). 
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change toward a regime of assignments “with or without goodwill” and 
licensing “with or without control” should not happen to the detriment of 
consumers—that is, even under a regime of free trademark trading, the pri-
mary concern of trademark law should continue to be the protection of the 
public against the fraud that could result from abusive assignments and li-
censes.   
“In other words, even if consumers are not always legally entitled to 
receive goods and services of the same quality, they nonetheless have the 
right not to be deceived in making their purchases,”106 and should expect 
that the products they purchase are of the same quality, regardless of the 
actual manufacturers.107  Accordingly, if assignees or licensees decide to 
market products of different quality, they must alert the public to the 
changes before consumers carry out their purchases in the market.108  De-
spite the continued judicial skepticism of this solution,109 targeted advertis-
ing campaigns before the release of new products as well as the use of la-
bels directly on the products and on the premises where the products are 
sold could fulfill this duty to the public and serve as adequate notice of any 
changes.  Even if some consumers might not notice the new commercial or 
read the new label alerting them to changes in product quality, labels and 
disclaimers would nevertheless show that a reasonable effort was made on 
the part of the trademark owners or licensees to inform them of the new 
quality standards or product features.110 
Still, labels and disclaimers may not preclude negative consequences 
for consumers when unscrupulous individuals attempt to take unfair advan-
  
 106. Calboli, Trademark Assignment, supra note 12, at 836. 
 107. See, e.g., Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement 
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12 (2004); Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2004); Consumer Prod-
uct Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-85 (2000); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Gra-
nada Elecs., Inc., 816 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding consumer confusion because licensee 
imported Cabbage Patch dolls manufactured abroad, contrary to the terms of the license 
agreement); DC Comics v. Kryptonite Corp., 336 F. Supp. 2d 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding 
for plaintiff where defendant’s actions could cause consumer confusion, in a trademark in-
fringement case arising from breach of an agreement); Bay Summit Cmty. Ass’n v. Shell Oil 
Co., 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 322 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (holding the licensor strictly liable for harm to 
the consumers where licensees’ products proved defective); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS: MISREPRESENTATION BY SELLER OF CHATTELS TO CONSUMER § 402B (1965) 
(amended in 1998 by RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY § 9). 
 108. See Hy-Cross Hatchery, Inc. v. Osborne, 303 F.2d 947, 950 (C.C.P.A. 1962); see 
also Hanak, supra note 102, at 374.  “Courts have uniformly held that an adequate explana-
tion negates the possibility of deception and hence the loss of trademark rights.”  Hanak, 
supra note 102, at 374. 
 109. See, e.g., Burgess v. Gilman, 475 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1058 n.1 (D. Nev. 2007) 
(indicating in a footnote the court’s skepticism toward the idea that advertisements convey 
accurate information about products and product quality). 
 110. See Hanak, supra note 102, at 374. 
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tage of the public’s expectations of a particular mark.111  In these situations, 
however, it would be irrelevant whether a mark had been assigned or li-
censed “in gross.”  Rather, these would be instances of commercial fraud, 
where the owners of a mark use it to deceive the public.  Accordingly, those 
owners should be prevented from continuing such use and punished under 
the appropriate statutes.  In this sense, amending the current requirement 
would not diminish trademark owners’ civil and criminal liability with re-
spect to their accountability to consumers for the quality of their products.  
Even though some authors have called for more accountability for trade-
mark owners in these areas,112 products liability and consumer protection 
laws113 would continue to guarantee that assignees and licensees respect the 
required product standards and do not deceive consumers, since they would 
face civil and criminal liability for commercial fraud.114 
In addition, from a strict trademark law standpoint, Sections 14 and 45 
of the Lanham Act would still continue to prohibit fraudulent uses of a mark 
under a system of free trademark trading.115  Specifically, the proposed 
amendments would not affect the current language or application of these 
provisions, and the judiciary would continue to be able to refer to Sections 
14 and 45 to protect the public against misleading assignments and licenses.  
Likewise, the proposed amendments would not affect the language of Sec-
tion 43(a) of the Lanham Act, and competitors would still be able to bring 
civil actions under this provision if they believed they had suffered damages 
due to the misleading use of an assigned or licensed mark.116  Simply put, 
  
 111. Calboli, Trademark Assignment, supra note 12, at 837; see also Hanak, supra 
note 102, at 374. 
 112. See David J. Franklyn, The Apparent Manufacturer Doctrine, Trademark Licen-
sors and the Third Restatement of Torts, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 671, 721 (1999). 
 113. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12 (2000) (consisting of statutes governing con-
sumer product warranties and the FTC); id. § 2051 (demonstrating congressional intent that 
the public should be protected from unreasonable risks associated with consumer products); 
see also Franklyn, supra note 112, at 675. 
 114. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2069 (consisting of civil penalties under the Consumer 
Product Safety Act); id. § 2070 (consisting of criminal penalties under the Consumer Product 
Safety Act). 
 115. See discussion supra Sections I.A-B. 
 116. See Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000). 
(a) Civil action. 
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any con-
tainer for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or 
any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading de-
scription of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which-- 
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affilia-
tion, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the 
origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activi-
ties by another person, or 
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under a regime of trading trademarks “in gross,” rather than canceling a 
mark or declaring it abandoned because of the absence of transfer of good-
will or lack of quality control, courts would directly invalidate those agree-
ments that are likely to deceive or mislead consumers.117 
In particular, when assessing whether the use of a mark is in line with 
Sections 14, 45, or 43(a), under the new standards, courts should consider 
whether quality alterations exist among the products distributed under that 
mark.  If courts find any difference in quality, they should look at whether 
those differences are likely to harm even a small sector of the public.  In the 
cases where these differences could lead to confusion or deception, courts 
should void the agreement at issue and cancel the mark or declare it aban-
doned.118  At the same time, when the public is not likely to be deceived, 
courts should allow the agreement to stand.  Generally, courts should also 
consider whether any quality variation is required by law or by market 
needs119 and, if this is the case, courts should presume the agreement valid 
as long as all new products follow the new quality guidelines and trademark 
owners and licensees put forth all reasonable efforts to inform the public of 
the changes.120  However, if quality variation applies only to some of the 
products distributed by the trademark owner or licensee, and if there is no 
valid reason for this variation,121 courts should presume the agreement to be 
void because of the likelihood that consumers would be deceived.122 
  
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteris-
tics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person’s goods, ser-
vices, or commercial activities,  
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is 
likely to be damaged by such act. 
Id. 
 117. But see Parks, supra note 7, at 552. 
 118. See discussion supra Sections I.A-B. 
 119. MCDONALD’S, for example, has recently changed well-known recipes in order 
to eliminate trans fats from its menus, in response to a demand for healthier products.  See 
Jeannine DeFoe, Food Makers Get on a Health Kick: PepsiCo, Kraft, and Others Are Mak-
ing Strides in Reducing Trans Fats and Producing Healthier Foods to Meet Consumer De-
mand, BUS. WK., Dec. 14, 2006, http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/dec- 
2006/pi20061214_187559.htm.  See also 21 C.F.R. § 101.45 (2006) (detailing strict labeling 
requirements for foods containing trans fats). 
 120. See Carter v. Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co., 360 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D. Pa. 1973); 
Franklyn, supra note 112, at 707. 
 121. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 96, at 375. 
 122. For a detailed analysis of the steps that the courts should follow in the proposed 
regime of trading trademarks “in gross,” see Calboli, Trademark Assignment, supra note 12, 
at 838-39 (describing the steps with respect to the judicial application of Sections 14, 45, and 
43(a) under a rule of assignment “with or without goodwill”) and Calboli, Trademark Licens-
ing, supra note 13, at 404-05 (describing the steps with respect to the judicial application of 
the same provisions under a rule of licensing “with or without control”). 
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Finally, the suggested amendments of assignment “with or without 
goodwill” and licensing “with or without control” would not affect the lan-
guage of Section 14(5) of the Lanham Act,123 under which the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) can cancel trademark registrations when trademark 
owners use their marks misleadingly to induce consumers to purchase prod-
ucts that do not meet their expectations.124  Under Section 5 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act,125 the FTC also has the authority to prevent acts of 
unfair competition in general.126  This power includes preventing all acts 
that involve the use of deceptive marks.127  The FTC has often sent cease-
and-desist orders to companies to prohibit “‘the use of trademarks that in-
herently are deceptive.’”128  Again, a shift toward a system of “free trade-
mark trading” would not affect the FTC’s role in these areas, and the FTC 
would continue to be in charge of protecting the interests of consumers and 
the market by canceling deceptive marks. 
CONCLUSION 
During the past century, trademarks have become increasingly impor-
tant due to the rise of consumer society and the transformation of the manu-
facturing sectors because of globalization.  So far, however, these changes 
have not reached the statutory language that dictates the conditions that 
trademark owners have to observe to validly assign and license their marks.  
  
 123. Section 14 of the Lanham Act states: “[T]he Federal Trade Commission may 
apply to cancel . . . any mark registered on the principal register established by this chapter.”  
15 U.S.C. § 1064 (2000). 
 124. See, e.g., Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 611-12 (1946) (“The Commis-
sion has wide discretion in its choice of a remedy deemed adequate to cope with the unlawful 
practices in this area of trade and commerce.”); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. FTC, 95 F.T.C. 
406, 517 n.9 (1980), quoted in FTC v. Wolf, No. 94-8119-CIV-Ferguson, 1996 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 1760, at *14 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 1996); see also Bart Schwartz Int’l Textiles, Ltd. v. 
FTC, 289 F.2d 665 (C.C.P.A. 1961). 
 125. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2000)). 
 126. See, e.g., Arthur Best, Controlling False Advertising: A Comparative Study of 
Public Regulation, Industry Self-Policing, and Private Litigation, 20 GA. L. REV. 1, 20-25 
(1985); Thomas L. Ruffner, Note, The Failed GE/Honeywell Merger: The Return of Portfo-
lio-Effects Theory?, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1285, 1299 (2003). 
 127. Section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act provides that “[u]nfair 
methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in 
or affecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful.”  15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).  “Unfair” prac-
tices are defined in § 5(n) as those that “cause[] or [are] likely to cause substantial injury to 
consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed 
by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.”  Id. § 45(n). 
 128. Calboli, Trademark Assignment, supra note 12, at 841 (quoting Hanak, supra 
note 102, at 373); see also R. Neumann & Co. v. Overseas Shipments, Inc., 326 F.2d 786, 
788 (C.C.P.A. 1964); Gaffrig Performance Indus., Inc. v. Livorsi Marine, Inc., Nos. 
99C7778, 99C7822, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23018 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 19, 2003). 
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As a result, trademark owners and the market continue to be subject to pro-
visions that are outdated and plagued by inconsistency in their interpreta-
tion.  Well aware of these problems, the judiciary has increasingly drifted 
away from the current standards and de facto adopted a trend that favors 
trading trademarks “in gross.”  Such a judicial rule of reason still leaves 
gaps for ambiguity, however, and competitors are often left wondering what 
represents a valid agreement. 
Because such uncertainty is not acceptable, the time has come to re-
vise the current standards and adopt a system that would allow trading 
trademarks “in gross,” i.e., trademark assignment “with or without good-
will” and trademark licensing “with or without control.”  As this Article has 
demonstrated, these changes would finally bring the statutory language in 
line with judicial interpretation and business reality.  Furthermore, the 
changes would also not affect consumers and the market since the courts 
have alternative instruments to prevent misleading assignments and li-
censes.  Accordingly, despite possible criticism against them, these changes 
should be welcome as positive advancements in trademark law and practice. 
